India’s Struggles with Weapons System Projects: Key Causes

Background

Over the years, India's defense development programs, led by the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), have faced significant challenges in delivering advanced weapons systems on time and within budget. The much touted “Make in India” initiative, launched in 2014 to transform India into a global manufacturing hub, has also fallen short of its ambitious goals in the defense sector, particularly in achieving self-reliance and reducing import dependency. Below is a review of some notable problematic defense projects along with the analysis about reasons for failures:-

1. Arjun Main Battle Tank (MBT). The Arjun MBT, developed by the Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment (CVRDE) under DRDO, aimed to create an indigenous third-generation tank for the Indian Army. Initiated in 1974, it was intended to counter potential threats like Pakistan’s acquisition of advanced tanks. The tank entered service in 2004, but its development was marred by delays and performance issues.

• Cost: Initial cost estimates in 1974 were ₹15.5 crore (equivalent to ₹464 crore or ~US$55 million in 2023). By 1995, developmental costs had escalated to ₹307.48 crore (equivalent to ₹18 billion or ~US$217 million in 2023). Each Arjun Mk II tank estimated at ~US$6.6 million, makes it one of the most expensive tanks.

• Delays: Development took nearly 30 years (1974–2004) instead of the planned 10–15 years. Sequential revisions to the Army’s General Staff Qualitative Requirement (GSQR) in 1982 and 1985, combined with DRDO’s over-optimism, contributed to delays.

• Technical Difficulties:

  a. Engine and Mobility: The Arjun’s weight increased from 40 tons to 62 tons due to enhanced Kanchan composite armor, reducing its power-to-weight ratio and mobility. The imported MTU MB 838 Ka-501 diesel engine (1,400 hp) was insufficient for the heavier design, and engine supply shortages delayed deliveries of the Mk1A variant as of 2024.

  b.Imported Components: Approximately 50% of components, including the engine, transmission, gun barrel, and fire control systems, are imported, undermining self-reliance goals.

  c.Technical Reliability: By 2015, nearly 75% of the 124 Arjun Mk I tanks were inoperable due to over 90 technical faults, including issues with the fire control system, suspension, and turret control.

  d.Trial Results: Initial trials from 1993–1996 revealed engine overheating and sub-optimal performance of the 120 mm rifled gun. The integration of the Israeli LAHAT missile was abandoned in 2014 due to performance issues, prompting DRDO to develop the indigenous SAMHO missile, which faced its own development challenges.

• Outcome: The Indian Army ordered only 124 Mk I and 118 Mk1A tanks, far fewer than needed to replace the aging T-72 fleet. The Army prefers Russian T-90 tanks and is exploring the T-14 Armata, signaling limited confidence in the Arjun program. The Future Ready Combat Vehicle (FRCV) program aims to replace Arjun entirely.

2.Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) – Tejas : The LCA Tejas, developed by the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) under DRDO, was intended to provide the Indian Air Force (IAF) with a modern, multi-role fighter to replace aging MiG-21s. Launched in 1983, it aimed for induction by the mid-1990s but achieved Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) only in 2013 and Full Operational Clearance (FOC) in 2019. Project is still marred with difficulties

• Cost: The program’s cost escalated significantly, though exact figures are not known. By 2013, delays and cost overruns were noted to have reduced the IAF’s war-fighting potential. The development of the Mk II variant and related upgrades continues to incur high costs, with no specific total publicly disclosed.

• Delays: The project missed its original 1990s deadline, with a revised completion date of December 2010 extended to 2015. Even by 2010, the IAF accepted the LCA Mk I with “sub-optimal performance” due to unresolved issues.

• Technical Difficulties: The Kaveri engine, intended to power the LCA, was a major failure. Initiated in 1986, it was meant to be completed by 1996 but faced technical challenges like insufficient thrust and weight issues. By 2009, the project was effectively shelved, and the LCA relies on imported General Electric GE-F404 engines, with delays in their supply disrupting production as recently as 2025.

• Performance Shortfalls: The LCA failed to meet 1985 IAF requirements, including weight-to-power ratio, turn rates, supersonic acceleration, and maximum angle of attack. The aircraft’s weight increased by 900 kg over the original 9-ton specification, reducing agility.

• Avionics and Systems: Delays in developing radar, flight control systems, and avionics required foreign collaboration, increasing dependency. The integration of advanced systems like the Uttam AESA radar for the Mk1A variant is still ongoing.

• Outcome: The IAF has inducted 48 LCA Mk I fighters, but five major unresolved issues persist, limiting combat capability. The Mk II variant is under development to meet original requirements, but the IAF’s reliance on foreign aircraft like the Rafale persists due to delays.

3.Akash Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) System : The Akash SAM, a medium-range air defense system developed by DRDO, was designed to protect against aircraft, cruise missiles, and drones up to 45 km away. Initiated in the 1980s, it faced significant significant delays before partial induction in 2014 (Army) and 2015 (Air Force).

• Cost: The total development cost was approximately ₹600 crore (~US$72 million in 2023), relatively modest compared to other projects. Production costs for squadrons are higher, with export deals (e.g., to Armenia) involving systems like Akash valued at undisclosed amounts.

• Delays: Development took over 20 years, far exceeding initial timelines due to DRDO’s over-optimistic projections and lack of early coordination with the armed forces.

• Technical Difficulties:

  a.System Integration: Integration of radar, command systems, and interceptors remained problematic, delaying operational readiness.

  b.Performance Limitations: The Akash faced issues with reliability and accuracy in early tests, requiring multiple iterations. Its range and altitude capabilities (45 km, 18 km) are modest compared to modern systems like the S-400.

  c.Dependency on Imports: While largely indigenous, some critical components, like radar systems, initially relied on foreign technology, complicating development.

• Outcome: The Akash has been inducted into the Indian Army and Air Force and claimed some success in Operation Sindoor (2025). However, its delayed development and limited range has pushed India to procure advanced systems like the S-400 and develop Project Kusha.

4.Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) and Advanced Air Defence (AAD) – Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) System : Initiated in 1999 post-Kargil War, the Indian BMD program is a two-tiered system to counter ballistic missile threats. PAD (exo-atmospheric interception at 50–80 km altitude) and AAD (endo-atmospheric interception at 15–30 km) form the core of Phase-I, designed to intercept missiles with ranges up to 2,000 km. Phase-II includes AD-1 and AD-2 interceptors for ranges up to 5,000 km.

• Costs: Phase-I development cost approximately ₹2,000 crore ($240 million). Phase-II, including AD-1 and AD-2, is estimated at ₹1,500–2,000 crore ($180–240 million). Deployment around Delhi and Mumbai is projected to cost ₹10,000 crore ($1.2 billion), with installation pending government approval.

• Features: PAD (Pradyumna and PDV variants) uses a kinetic kill vehicle for exo-atmospheric interception at speeds up to Mach 5. AAD (Ashwin) is a single-stage, solid-fueled missile for endo-atmospheric interception, using explosive warheads. Supported by Swordfish long-range tracking radar and a claimed secure command-and-control network.Phase-II AD-1 and AD-2 missiles incorporate advanced guidance systems for intercepting IRBMs and ICBMs, with AD-1 tested successfully in November 2022 and July 2024.

• Technical Difficulties:

  a. Radar Tracking Accuracy: Tests (2006–2012) faced issues with radar tracking accuracy and interceptor reliability in high-altitude conditions.

  b. Missile Stability: Integration of sea-based BMD systems (e.g., INS Anvesh) encountered delays due to platform stability and missile weight.

  c. Poor Performance Against Hypersonic Targets: Phase-II development has proven to be complex be more complex than anticipated, requiring advanced seekers and propulsion system for hypersonic targets.

• Outcome: Phase-I is complete, with successful tests of PAD and AAD, but the system awaits official commissioning. Deployment around Delhi is pending approval, expected to take 3–4 years post-clearance. Phase-II AD-1 was claimed to be successfully tested in July 2024, demonstrating capability against ballistic missiles. AD-2 is still under development, with trials expected in late 2026. Sea-based BMD tests from INS Anvesh have been partially successful.

5.Project Kusha (Extended Range Air Defence System – ERADS): Launched in 2022, Project Kusha aims to develop a long-range SAM system (150–350 km range) to bridge the gap between MR-SAM (80 km) and S-400 (400 km). It is expected to target stealth fighters, aircraft, cruise missiles, and hypersonic threats up to Mach 7.

• Costs: Approved for ₹21,700 crore ($2.6 billion) for five IAF squadrons, with additional funding for naval variants. Development costs are estimated at ₹1,000 crore ($120 million).

• Features: Three interceptor variants: M1 (150 km), M2 (200–250 km), and M3 (350 km) for ballistic missile defense and large platforms like AWACS. Equipped with Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) seekers, infrared, and radio frequency guidance for precision targeting. Integrates with IAF’s IACCS and S-400 for coordinated interception.

• Technical Difficulties:

  a. Design Changes: Fabrication of M1 missiles is still ongoing due to design iterations, with delays in developing hypersonic interception capabilities. Also difficulties in high-speed propulsion systems have slowed progress.

  b. Radar Integration: Complexities being faced in AESA radar integration.

• Outcome: M1 missile fabrication began in August 2024, with prototype completion expected by mid-2026 and user trials from 2026–2028. M1 trials are scheduled for September 2025 but are delayed, followed by M2 and M3 in 2026–2027.Limited domestic expertise in countering hypersonic threats has called for foreign collaboration (with Israel). Induction is planned for 2028–2030, with BEL as the integration partner.

6. Trishul Short-Range SAM: Part of the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP), Trishul was a short-range SAM (12 km range, 15 kg warhead) for low-flying and sea-skimming targets. Initiated in the 1980s, it was intended for the Indian Navy and Army. Development costs exceeded ₹500 crore ($60 million), however, no clear cost figures are available due to the program’s closure in 2008 after multiple unsuccessful trials. Project has been replaced by Israeli Barak-1 missile for naval use.

7.Very Short-Range Air Defence System (VSHORADS): A man-portable and vehicle-mountable system to counter low-flying aircraft, drones, and cruise missiles at ranges up to 7 km. Claimed to be tested successfully in September 2022, it is designed for the Indian Army’s Integrated Battle Groups.

• Costs: Development costs are estimated at ₹500 crore ($60 million), with procurement costs for 120–420 units projected at ₹2,000–3,000 crore ($240–360 million).

• Desired Features: Ultraviolet, near-infrared, and mid-infrared sensors for low-signature target detection. Lightweight design for two-man operation, with vehicle and aircraft mount options.

• Technical Issues: Integration of multi-spectral sensors faced delays due to miniaturization issues. Limited range compared to foreign systems like the U.S. Stinger requires complementary systems for layered defense.

• Outcome: Claimed successful technically tests in 2022, with user trials ongoing as of 2025. Initial order of 120 units placed, with plans for full induction by 2027.

8.VL-SRSAM (Vertical Launch Short-Range SAM): Inspired from the Astra air-to-air missile, VL-SRSAM is a naval SAM system to replace Barak-1, with a range of 40–50 km. It targets aircraft, drones, and cruise missiles.

• Costs: Development costs are approximately ₹1,000 crore ($120 million), with procurement costs for naval integration undisclosed.

• Desired Features: Vertical launch capability for 360-degree coverage. Active radar seeker and inertial guidance for precision targeting. Compatible with Indian Navy’s surface vessels.

• Technical Difficulties: Delays in adapting Astra’s air-to-air guidance for surface-launched applications. Integration with naval fire control systems required multiple test iterations.

• Outcome: Successfully tested in 2022–2024, with integration on Indian Navy ships underway. Delayed induction into service to supplement Barak-8 and Akash systems.

9.Kaveri Engine: The Kaveri engine, developed by DRDO’s Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE), was intended to power the LCA Tejas and other platforms. Started in 1986, it was meant to be completed by 1996 but remains incomplete, with a “dry” variant for unmanned vehicles sanctioned in 2025.

• Cost: Development costs escalated significantly, with ₹472.42 crore sanctioned for the dry engine and ₹251.17 crore for technology demonstration by 2025. Total costs over decades are likely much higher but not fully disclosed.

• Delays: The project missed its 1996 deadline, with a revised completion date of 2009 extended indefinitely. As of 2025, the engine is still not operational for manned aircraft.

• Technical Difficulties:

  a. Insufficient Thrust: The Kaveri failed to deliver the required thrust (81–90 kN) for the LCA, achieving only ~70 kN, necessitating reliance on GE-F404 engines.

  b. Material and Design Issues: Challenges in high-temperature materials and compressor design led to inefficiencies and weight issues.

  c. Lack of Expertise: Limited domestic expertise in aero-engine technology required foreign collaboration, which was hampered by export controls.

• Outcome: The Kaveri’s failure forced the LCA program to use imported engines, delaying production and increasing costs. Recent sanctions for a dry variant suggest a shift to unmanned applications.

10.Multi-Caliber Assault Rifle (MCAR) Program : Initiated in 2011 to replace the 5.56mm INSAS rifle, the MCAR aimed to develop a rifle capable of switching between 5.56mm and 7.62mm calibers by changing barrels, a highly ambitious requirement.

• Delays: The program failed spectacularly, with no viable prototype developed by 2024. After 13 years, the Indian Army began inducting Russian AK-203 rifles in 2023 under a joint venture with Kalashnikov.

• Costs: Specific cost figures are unavailable, but the program’s failure led to significant sunk costs in R&D and trials. The AK-203 deal, as an alternative, involves a $600 million contract for 670,000 rifles, with each rifle costing around $1,100–1,500, higher than initially planned.

• Technical Difficulties:

  a. Unrealistic Requirements: The Army’s demand for a multi-caliber rifle was technologically unfeasible, as no international vendor could meet the barrel-switching requirement without compromising reliability or weight.

  b. Industrial Limitations: India’s small arms industry, primarily Ordnance Factory Board (OFB), lacked the expertise to develop a sophisticated rifle, leading to repeated design failures.

  c. Testing and Validation: Prototypes failed to meet Army standards in accuracy, reliability, and durability under field conditions, prolonging trials and increasing costs.

• Outcome: The MCAR program was abandoned, and the Army opted for the AK-203, highlighting DRDO’s and OFB’s inability to deliver a modern assault rifle.

11.Nag Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM): Part of the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP), Nag is a third-generation fire-and-forget ATGM designed to defeat modern armor. Development began in the 1980s.

• Delays: Nag faced over 20 years of delays, with user trials completed only in 2019. Induction began in limited numbers by 2020.

• Costs: Estimated development cost exceeds ₹1,000 crore ($120 million), with per-unit costs around ₹50–70 lakh ($60,000–85,000).

• Technical Difficulties:

  a. Imaging Infrared (IIR) Seeker: From the start seekers struggled with target acquisition in high-temperature desert conditions, a critical issue for India’s western borders. Upgrades to improve seeker performance delayed trials.

  b. Weight and Mobility: The missile’s weight and the Namica carrier’s mobility issues limited operational deployment.

• Outcome: Limited induction in the Army, with the Man-Portable ATGM (MPATGM) derived from Nag showing promise but still in trials as of 2025.

Analysis

Over-Optimistic Timelines: The developer notably, DRDO’s tendency to underestimate development timelines, as noted by the P Rama Rao committee, led to decades-long delays in most of the operationally critical projects.

Protectionism and DRDO: DRDO has historically been the main weapons developer for Indian Armed forces. Realizing the inefficiencies, the Indian Government made a plan to overhaul and reform DRDO, and a committee was formed in 2023 for the purpose. The committee submitted its report in July 2024 but reportedly, the recommendations have been declared as contentious and implementation of reforms has been delayed due to opposition from senior DRDO officials. Creation of nine DPSUs (Defence Public Sector Undertakings) "Navratna" point to that fact that Indian government realized that DRDO model failed to deliver as per expectations.

Lack of Coordination: Ambitious General Staff Qualitative Requirements (GSQR), frequent changes in specifications, poor early involvement of the armed forces resulted in misaligned expectations.

Technical Complexity: Developing state-of-the-art systems like composite armor, advanced radars, and aero-engines exceeded India’s industrial and technological base. However, protectionist policies of the government precluded meaningful cooperation with International firms

Import Dependency: Reliance on foreign components (e.g., engines, avionics) undermined self-reliance and exposed projects to supply chain disruptions. In addition, metallurgy base in the country remains weak due to which military specs alloys and steels have to be imported.

Bureaucratic Hurdles: India’s bureaucratic processes delayed decision-making and funding, exacerbating cost overruns.

Inadequate Infrastructure: Lack of skilled manpower and testing facilities has slowed progress in defense sector, resulting in increased costs.

Conclusion

Despite a defense production of ₹1.27 lakh crore (US$15.3 billion) in FY 2023–24, a 174% increase from 2014–15, India remains the world’s largest arms importer, accounting for 9.8% of global arms imports in 2023. Key defense projects face decades-long delays due to technical challenges, over-optimistic timelines, unrealistic user requirements and reliance on imported components. Recent restructuring of DRDO and OFB into DPSUs (Defense Public Sector Undertakings) indicate a shift in policy with increased reliance on private industry and international partnerships.